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Denial of Service is a complex and context-specific problem. This document aims to cover 
some of the common scenarios and provides guidance for prevention and response. It is not 
designed to mitigate all attacks or be the definitive guide to all instances of Denial of Service. 
There are new types of attacks every day and many alternative solutions. This document 
has been peer reviewed by a number of individuals and organizations prior to release and is 
constantly being updated. We encourage comments, suggestions, or information which will 
improve this guide and ensure that it is as up to date, relevant and as accurate as possible 
(email soc@accessnow.org). If mitigation of an attack is beyond your capability or the scope 
of this document, please contact trusted technical assistance or email soc@accessnow.org. 
Visit our website at https://www.accessnow.org.
1IntroductIon
Civil Society currently faces significant cyber threats. At the 
top of the list of those threats are Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. 
The websites of many organizations and individuals have already 
come under such attacks, and the frequency of those attacks are 
on the rise. Civil Society frequently does not have the kinds of 
resources or technical know-how that is available to commercial 
enterprise and government websites, and often have to exist in 
adverse political environments where every avenue available, both 
legal and illegal, is used against them. Therefore, the threat of DoS 
attacks is unlikely to go away any time soon.
A Denial of Service (DoS) attack is any attack that overwhelms 
a website, causing the content normally provided by that website 
to no longer be available to regular visitors of the website. 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks are traffic volume-
based attacks originating from a large number of computers, 
which are usually compromised workstations. These workstations, 
known as ‘zombies’, form a widely distributed attack network 
called a ‘botnet’. While many modern Denial of Service attacks 
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are Distributed Denial of Service attacks, this is certainly not 
true for all denials of service experienced by websites. Therefore, 
when users first start experiencing difficulty in getting to the 
website content, it should not be assumed that the site is under a 
DDoS attack. Many forms of DoS are far easier to implement than 
DDoS, and so these attacks are still used by parties with malicious 
intent. Many such DoS attacks are easier to defend against once 
the mechanism used to cause the denial of service is known. 
Therefore, it is paramount to do proper analysis of attack traffic 
when a site becomes unable to perform its normal function.  
There are two parts to this guide. The first part outlines 
preparatory steps that can be taken by Civil Society organizations 
to improve their website’s resilience, should it come under attack. 
However, we do understand that most Civil Society organizations’ 
first introduction to DoS attacks comes when they suddenly find 
themselves the victim of an attack. The second part of this guide 
provides a step-by-step process to assist the staff of NGOs to 
efficiently deal with that stressful situation.  
StrategIeS
hoStIng locatIon
load bal anced MIrrorS
doSP
bIg bandWIdth MIrrorS
FIreWallIng
dIStrIbuted content
ForgoIng the doMaIn
oPen ProvIder MIrrorS
darknet
PreParatory 
PhaSe
InItIal 
PhaSe
reStoratIve 
PhaSe
long-terM 
PhaSe
* Enact here if pre-prepared or determine if provider or provider’s provider has DoSP in place
** If set up in advance (Preparatory Phase), then this mitigation strategy is enacted in this phase
X*
X**
X**
For more information,  
please contact:
soc@accessnow.org
PGP Key ID: 0xF08D380A
/////////////////////////////////////////////////
///  deFendIng agaInSt /////////
///  denIal oF ServIce ////////////
/////////////////////////////////////////////////
2International Hosting Location Strategy
hoStIng locatIon
The capabilities, geographic location, 
and the appetite to tolerate attacks by 
your website hosting provider may be 
a significant factor in the ability your 
opponents have in affecting your site. 
Therefore, it is advised you take careful 
consideration in choosing the hosting 
provider or providers of your website 
carefully in advance.
Denial of Service attacks are effective by 
exhausting your resources, so it is wise to 
ask yourself how much resources could you 
commit to an attack before you got to the 
point of resource exhaustion brought your 
site to a standstill. Think of all the resources 
involved including (but not limited to) 
hardware and software application limits, 
network and bandwidth limits, engineering 
and technician time, and financial costs.
Ask questions of your potential 
providers: how much bandwidth is 
dedicated to your site? How much 
bandwidth could be consumed by an attack, 
and how many days would the provider 
tolerate an attack before refusing to host 
your site? Is your site able to be moved out 
of a shared virtual environment and onto a 
dedicated server if it comes under attack 
(to protect other customer’s websites from 
being affected by the attack against your 
site)? What Denial of Service Protections 
do they have in place and/or offer to 
customers?
This is also true of the provider hosting 
the DNS for your site. Ask them how many 
DNS requests per second they would 
tolerate before refusing to respond to name 
service requests.
international Hosting 
location strategy
If you oppose the government or are highly 
critical of other sectors within your country, 
then it is probably not a good idea to host 
your website within the geographic borders 
of your country. Some political opposition 
groups have come under DDoS attack, and 
when they asked their service provider 
to assist in mitigating the attacks, they 
received no assistance whatsoever. It is 
believed the service providers were under 
pressure from the government to withhold 
any assistance to the website owners. It 
must also be noted that if the government 
has control of traffic at key points of the 
internet infrastructure within the borders of 
the nation, then it may be possible for them 
to outright block access to, divert traffic 
away from, or choke down the bandwidth 
to your website, creating a very effective 
denial of service to some visitors to your 
website (depending on what infrastructure 
the government has control of, where it is 
located, where your users are located, etc.).
Another issue to consider in relation 
to geographic location of your hosting 
provider is the question of legal jurisdiction. 
If you host your website within the nation 
or in a nation with very close ties to the 
government, you may provide them with an 
Part 1: PreParatory PhaSe
Most DoS mitigation strategies are best implemented well ahead of time. Some strategies, 
such as the various types of site mirroring, are implemented as the normal operating procedure 
whether the site is under attack or not. These strategies are architectures for your website that 
are good for reach and performance, as well as for resilience to DoS attacks. Other strategies 
are organized and lie dormant, waiting to be activated if the site comes under DoS attack. 
Darknets are certainly in that category, and the use of Distributed Content as a mitigation 
strategy (rather than a strategy for reach) is as well.
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3easy avenue to find or create laws to shut 
down your site. The solution to these issues 
is to host your website internationally, away 
from the infrastructural control of the local 
authorities, and in a jurisdiction that is 
politically neutral to the content of the site.
local Hosting  
location strategy
There may be good reason not to implement 
the International Hosting Strategy (as per 
above), so careful consideration should be 
given to the best solution that meets your 
specific situation. If your website audience 
is entirely local to your country, and there 
is enough incentive for the authorities to 
hold back from blatant censorship of your 
website, then it may be a better strategy 
against DDoS attacks to host your site 
within the borders of your country. If 
your opponents engage the services of 
a botnet on the black market to attack 
your website, it is highly likely that the 
majority of the zombie nodes that make 
up that botnet will be located outside of 
your country. It is therefore possible to go 
some way to mitigating a DDoS attack by 
simply dropping all traffic at an upstream 
firewall that originates from computers not 
located within your country. This leaves 
your website available for your local target 
audience. To differentiate between national 
and international connections geolocation 
will need to be done either at the firewall or 
a forward proxy. Some firewalls and proxies 
will come with this functionality out of the 
box and rules can be written for others 
to achieve this capability. Note also that 
the effectiveness of this strategy may be 
limited if the attack utilizes spoofed source 
addresses.
thIrd Party denIal  
oF ServIce ProtectIon 
(doSP)
When choosing a hosting service provider, 
take into careful consideration any offerings 
they may have for the provision of Denial of 
Service Protection (DoSP). DoSP can take 
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many forms, but usually the most cost-
effective options will be organized by your 
hosting provider, so choose carefully. Some 
basic DoSP options are guarantees made 
about short-term increases in the provision 
of bandwidth to your site to cope with rate-
based denial of service attacks. At the other 
end of the scale are global providers who 
specialize in this area and have agreements 
with most of the world’s large Telcos may 
provide stronger DoSP, as these agreements 
may allow them the ability to ‘clean’ 
incoming traffic or stop attacks closer to 
their source rather than waiting until the 
attack traffic reaches the network where 
your website is hosted. DoSP cleaning of 
the traffic destined for your site can be 
done at your hosting location, or with the 
traffic re-routed to a traffic cleaning centre 
by re-routing your traffic with altered BGP 
routes or use of reverse proxy and DNS 
re-announce. Arbor Networks provides this 
kind of service (http://www.arbornetworks.
com/). There are also DoSP ‘middlemen’: 
companies that offer DoSP services from 
a number of higher-level DoSP providers 
bundled together as a single service, 
which is then offered to a large number of 
clients. These middlemen often are able to 
provide the best DoS protection at a very 
reasonable price. DOSarrest is one example 
of a middleman DoSP provider  
(http://www.dosarrest.com/).
PreParIng MIrrorS
The aim of website mirroring is to distribute 
content across multiple service providers, 
multiple geographic locations, and multiple 
allocations of bandwidth, so that the 
website content has some resilience to 
disruptive events, whether from localized 
natural or political events or malicious 
activity. Building the website so it can be 
bundled, moved, installed, and reinstalled 
easily is a great strategy for preparing to 
mitigate DoS attacks through establishing 
mirror sites. In order to put your website 
together like this, you will need to take into 
consideration the technologies used to build 
and run your site. Answering the following 
questions will assist in preparing a site  
for mirroring:
1. Will the technologies run on 
differently configured platforms?
2. What software dependencies  
are there?
3. Can all those dependencies be 
isolated and bundled with the  
website content?
4. If the site is data-driven, are you  
able to bundle that data into the  
same package?
5. Will the site run with snapshots of the 
data, or is the data so real-time that 
it cannot be pre-bundled (even if on a 
nightly basis or similar)?
Another challenge with preparing for 
mirroring is finding a way to test mirror 
creation under the kinds of circumstances 
that would be experienced in the heat 
of an ongoing DoS attack. Ideally, a site 
administrator would have accounts with 
multiple hosting providers (for the purpose 
of hosting mirrors when required), and 
these accounts would be used to test the 
ability of the site’s tech team to deploy, 
install, and verify the installation of an 
instance of the site onto the test server. 
In this way, issues could be ironed out 
before the procedure has to be done under 
the more extreme circumstances of a real 
attack. This test process should not be 
performed once and then forgotten about. 
It should be a regularly scheduled event, 
as the environment, the components that 
make up the website, and the data that sits 
behind it all change frequently.
load Balanced Mirrors
Load balanced mirroring is possible by 
re-delegating the DNS for the website 
domain to point to a device that distributes 
incoming requests across a number of 
mirrored instances of the website. Ideally, 
these instances of the website should be 
distributed to different hosting providers 
located in different geographic locations. 
Load balanced mirroring of a website 
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5can be set up in preparation of possible 
DoS attacks, but due to the additional 
complexity of setting up the load balancer 
and the expense of paying multiple service 
providers to host multiple instances of the 
website, this is often avoided until an active 
DoS event is initiated. To be able to use 
this type of mirroring, the credentials and 
information necessary to modify the DNS 
records for the domain are required. So is 
the ability to either host a load balancer 
technology with administrative rights, or to 
add configuration to a load balancing device 
that is provided as part of a service by one 
of the hosting providers. Examples of such 
load balancing devices include a whole 
range of options, from simple, cheap and 
open source reverse caching proxies (Nginx, 
Lighttpd, Varnish etc which run on a variety 
of operating systems such as Linux, BSD, 
and Microsoft), to proprietary, commercial 
and expensive load-balancing solutions (F5 
routers, etc).
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open provider Mirrors
One factor that makes Open Provider 
mirroring so popular amongst Civil Society 
site owners is that the services offered 
by the open providers are usually free or 
low-cost. An open provider mirror for a 
website is essentially a content publishing 
framework provided as a service, such as 
Wordpress or Facebook. These providers 
are good for defending against DoS because 
they have access to truly massive amounts 
of total bandwidth resources, which 
they seem happy to use liberally when 
an account in their system comes under 
significant rate-based DoS attack. The 
disadvantage is that these frameworks were 
designed to lower the barrier for average 
people to publish content, and therefore 
they provide fairly generic and limited 
scope for the design and the delivery of 
dynamic content. The aim of using an open 
provider mirror is to host the most critical 
content of your original site elsewhere in 
a more static form. In preparation for this 
type of mitigation before an event occurs, 
the architects of the site can think about 
ways to automate the process of generating 
and keeping static versions of critical site 
content. They can also maintain accounts on 
these open mirror providers for publishing 
content or interacting with users, even 
though no DoS attack is in progress.
bIg bandWIdth 
ProvIderS
There is another type of big bandwidth 
provider out there that can be utilized 
for DoS mitigation. These big bandwidth 
providers are cloud service providers, 
such as Amazon and Rackspace. These 
services are not free and, in the long term, 
not even necessarily cheap, but they do 
have gigantic computing and networking 
resources at their disposal to ensure their 
clients’ content is kept available to their 
consumers as much as possible. From an 
architectural and technical point of view, the 
main consideration of using big bandwidth 
providers for DoS mitigation is ensuring 
that the chosen cloud provider/s offer the 
technical environment necessary to install 
and run a packaged version of your website.
dIStrIbuted content
This form of DoS mitigation looks at 
formatting content in such a way that it 
is easily consumable via many different 
protocols and in many different modes 
of presentation. It is important to adopt 
the MVC (Model, View, Controller) 
methodology, which separates the data, the 
processing of data, and the presentation 
of data into three very independent 
functions. In the context of DoS mitigation, 
this allows the data to always be available 
for distribution through different media, 
which helps ensure it is always available. 
Implementing this mitigation strategy 
involves designing your website to produce 
a version of your core content that is 
distributable via protocols such as RSS. In 
advance, you will need to organize channels 
that embed your content into other allied 
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websites. This gives you the ability to 
make the content of your site available 
to your users via those other sites if your 
own site is unavailable due to DoS attack. 
The standardization and simplicity of 
protocols like RSS make it possible for other 
site owners to quickly set up publishing 
channels for your content.
darknetS
Unlike other strategies, which can be 
enacted after the DoS has begun, ‘darknets’ 
will only work if set up as a preparatory 
denial of service protection measure. To 
set up a darknet, you must first purchase 
a range of IP addresses—for example, 
165.237.62.100 – 105. You allocate 100, 
101, 102, 104, and 105 to instances of web 
servers serving your website and put this 
array of IP addresses into the configuration 
of your load balancer. Since 103 is not 
allocated, it is left as a darknet. An attacker 
will see from DNS queries (etc.) that you 
have a range of IP addresses allocated to 
you, and that your website is distributed 
across the range. When they set up their 
attack, they may configure it to attack that 
same range of IP addresses rather than 
setting the target as the common name or 
URL for your website (such as ‘yoursite.
org’). Unknown to the attacker, the range 
contains a darknet, and when they initiate 
their attack, you will be able to monitor 
the machine associated with the 103 
address. Any traffic you see hitting that 
address is malicious traffic. This allows 
you to take any client IP addresses hitting 
that server and add them (perhaps even 
using an automated mechanism) to an 
upstream firewall. This reduces the number 
of attacker client IP addresses that get 
through, leaving more of your web server 
resources available to serve content to the 
IP addresses of your real users.
////////////////////////////////////////
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7All steps in teal should be worked through, and any answers arising from the questions posed therein should be 
recorded, as those answers may assist in the diagnosis of the attack.
Steps in pink require action to be taken, whether it be alterations of system configuration, swapping out and 
replacing hardware, or implementing one or more of the DoS mitigation strategies outlined in this document.
Green steps suggest some possible types of DoS attack that may relate to your situation. These are provided to 
assist your technical staff in narrowing the focus for further research they may have to do on specific DoS attacks that 
relate to the situation you are experiencing. Note that while it is unlikely you will actually experience some of the named 
attacks as operating systems etc are likely to have been patched against the attacks, it is still worthwhile referencing the 
attacks. The attack vectors utilized by old attacks are likely to come back with new vulnerabilities and researching the 
old attacks may assist your technicians deal with a new attack utilizing the same attack vector.
Any box with a number reference has a short description of further information following the chart in this document.
Part 2: reSPondIng to a doS attack
DoS attacks are stressful. They are stressful for the site’s visitors, who are not able to get to the 
site’s content. They are stressful for the staff of the organization, who knows their message is 
not reaching their audience. And they are stressful for the technical staff tasked with keeping 
the website operational. With this in mind, we have devised this simple to follow step-by-step 
process that will assist in keeping your technical staff efficiently focused on getting the website 
available to your audience again.
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8a. FaIled hardWare, PerManent doS
Check hardware for normal component failures. Cables, hard 
drives, power supplies, RAM, motherboards, CPU, and network 
interfaces are all critical components that could cause your web 
server to go offline. Do be aware that some attacks known as 
‘Permanent DoS’ exist which exploit vulnerabilities in hardware 
or firmware to ‘brick’ (irreparably destroy) hardware (usually by 
writing bogus programs to ROM chips on the hardware device). If 
you replace a failed hardware component with a new component 
that subsequently fails similarly to the old one, you may be 
experiencing a PDoS attack.
b. Set debug, loggIng For  
craSh analySIS
If the server is frequently crashing, you may need to set the debug 
level of some logging processes to a lower level. This may help 
you analyze the problem by looking at what was logged just before 
each crash.
c. uPgrade hardWare
If the denial of service you are experiencing manifests itself by 
the web server running out of compute ability or memory, then 
upgrading the CPU or RAM may provide immediate temporary 
relief. Some denial of service attacks are not rate-based, but 
rather attempt to locally consume all the available resources of 
components such as CPU and RAM.
d. unIntentIonal doS,  
local aPPlIcatIon doS
An Unintentional DoS is any denial of service that is accidental. 
This may be anything from a misconfigured local application, a 
poorly written custom program, a network technician unplugging 
the wrong cable at a patch panel, or the ‘Slashdot Effect’ (named 
after the site slashdot.org, where articles noting topics of interest 
to geeks were posted; the resultant immediate interest from 
Slashdot’s readership would usually bring down any website 
referenced!), so look for evidence of a sudden increase in 
legitimate visitor traffic due to some unplanned promotion of your 
website. Also look for evidence of a Local Application DoS, such 
as a fork bomb. If any such application is found, you will need to 
subsequently look for evidence of a hacker breach. See also (K). 
 
 
reSPonSe ProceSS
e. raId For SPeed
A Redundant Array of Independent Disks (RAID) is a technology 
that breaks data down into segments so that it can be spread 
across multiple disks, thus allowing parallel writes or reads, which 
can increase data I/O speed. Refer to Wikipedia for a comparison 
of the different RAID levels and their theoretical improvements on 
disk I/O performance (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RAID).
F. ddoS, drdoS, httP get Flood, 
Peer-to-Peer doS
Some form rate-based denial of service attack. This could be a 
Distributed Denial of Service attack using fraggle, a SYN Flood, 
HTTP GET Flood or similar; a Peer-to-peer DoS through a file 
sharing network using the ADC protocol or similar; or a Distributed 
Reflected Denial of Service attack, such as ICMP Echo Request / 
Smurf attacks or DNS amplification attacks, etc. Depending on the 
nature of the attack, defending against them can range from simply 
blocking the ports they use to more difficult measures (if the attack 
traffic is indistinguishable from legitimate traffic, for example).
g. aSyMMetrIc reSource 
utIlIzatIon StarvatIon attackS
Usually such an attack will be perpetrated using a very powerful 
or capable computer which has strengths that outperform the 
capability of your web server. The chosen capability could be 
network bandwidth, compute power, maximum number of 
concurrent connections, or some other resource.
h. degradatIon oF ServIce attackS
A Degradation of Service attack is any DoS attack performed in 
intermittent bursts to frustrate any initial attempt to work out 
what is wrong with the website. Users experience difficulty getting 
to the website, but by the time they are able to communicate the 
problem to the website technical team, the attack has ceased, so 
when the techs look at the server, everything appears normal. This 
pattern continues until the techs begin to monitor the website  
at all times.
I. IcMP/PIng Flood, SMurF, nuke, 
WInnuke, PIng oF death
Many ICMP attacks exist, and they form some of the oldest 
and most frequently used DoS attack methods. If ICMP is not 
important in your environment, then drop all ICMP traffic at  
your firewall.
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9J. Syn Flood, teardroP,  
loW rate doS
These are all TCP/IP protocol attacks. Most operating systems 
now have mechanisms to combat SYN Flood and Teardrop attacks, 
so ensure those mechanisms are compiled into your kernel. The 
Low Rate DoS attack exploits the TCP/IP protocol to convince 
your server to restrict throughput. Occasionally, new attacks that 
rely on poor implementations of the TCP/IP networking stack 
are brought to light. Patches will usually be issued by the stack 
developers reasonably quickly, but you may have to mitigate the 
attack as best you can in the meantime.
k. aPPlIcatIon level doS, 
SloWlorIS, InvIte oF death, etc.
Symptoms of Application Level DoS attacks often include, but 
are not limited to, system crashes and lockups, CPU and/or 
Memory at 100% utilization, or abuse of the application protocol. 
Application attacks may be hard to distinguish from legitimate 
traffic. For example, they could be complex SQL queries issued 
to a database backend which can result in high CPU, or database 
transaction blocks which may prevent other database writes and 
processes, subsequently resulting in crashing that may corrupt the 
database. Race conditions and thread starvation are also common 
mechanisms utilized in these attacks. Other specific examples of  
Application Level DoS attacks include HTTP POST DoS, Invite of 
Death, and Slowloris. Note that for Slowloris there may be a simple 
mitigation, such as moving your website to a Microsoft platform, as 
MS IIS is not susceptible to the attack. F5 load-balancing devices 
also mitigate this attack, so placing one on the network in front 
of your website would also work. Application attacks perpetrated 
across the network require the full TCP handshake, which means 
source IPs cannot be spoofed. You may be able to use this to 
your advantage by logging those source addresses, using some 
mechanism to add them to your firewall ruleset, and subsequently 
dropping all traffic originating from those addresses.
l. InItIal PhaSe oPtIonS
Enact Initial Phase options as laid out in the guide.
M. reStoratIve PhaSe oPtIonS
Enact Restorative Phase options as laid out in the guide.
n. FIndIng long terM SolutIonS
Enact Long Term solutions as laid out in the guide. Please refer 
to the Access website (https://www.accessnow.org) for more 
comprehensive and up-to-date information.
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PhaSeS For denIal oF ServIce attack MItIgatIon
For a website under a denial of service attack, it is useful to focus the mitigation of the  
attack into three phases of getting the site back online. These phases are the Initial Phase,  
the Restorative Phase, and the Long Term Phase. Note that regardless of DoS mitigation phase, 
one key thing to remember is that it is in the best interests of all your upstream providers 
to work with you to mitigate the DoS attack. If you are under a rate-based attack, it will be 
affecting their bandwidth, and may be affecting not just your website but also the sites and 
networks of other customers as well. Therefore, it is in everyone’s best interest to communicate 
and work together collaboratively. Let your upstream providers know this. Let them know you 
want to work with them to resolve the issue. Talk to your provider first. Then get them to talk  
to their provider.
InItIal PhaSe
The aim of the initial phase is to get as much of the content back 
up and available as possible while continuing to fully diagnose 
the attack. This may mean compromising about the fullness of 
coverage available on the site. It may mean the content is not 
available at the same levels of low latency and high bandwidth, but 
it does mean that content is able to be requested and received. 
It may mean the content is not in its normal full format, or its 
normal dynamic format. The data may have to be static, simplified 
or not as aesthetically formatted, but data should be available 
until a version more resembling the ‘normal’ site can be restored. 
Part of the Initial Phase should also be analysis of the DoS attack. 
This analysis can be done parallel to work being done to get the 
site content back up, and it will help greatly to determine which 
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approach to take in the Restorative Phase. To perform the analysis, 
the web server’s network interface will need to be ‘sniffed’ and 
packet captures taken. This can be done with tools such as 
Wireshark (http://www.wireshark.org/). Administrative access 
to the server will be needed as well to see how it is performing. 
Narrowing down the effect of the DoS attack can help in 
formulating an effective mitigation response.
InItIal PhaSe StrategIeS  
For MItIgatIng doS attackS
tHird party denial of service 
protection (dosp)
If DoSP has not been organized beforehand and you find yourself 
under attack, ask your hosting service provider if they are able 
to offer any DoSP. If the answer is no, then go to their upstream 
provider and ask the same question. It may be that a bigger 
provider upstream has the ability to utilize a DoSP service. The 
bigger or more ‘wholesale’ the service provider, the more likely 
they are to have an agreement to work with a DoSP service. If this 
turns out to be the case, then you may be able to negotiate with 
them to clean the traffic destined for your website before it even 
gets to the network of your service provider. 
firewalling
In the mitigation of DoS attacks, we should not discount the 
usefulness of even a basic firewall. While in some sense it is too 
late if the volume of a rate-based DoS attack is reaching a device 
just before your web site, there may be some usefulness here. If 
the firewall can be configured to drop as much of the malicious 
traffic as possible, then at least the web server itself may get some 
of its processing power back, which means that legitimate requests 
that do get through may actually be able to be served responses. 
The legitimate incoming and outgoing traffic will still have to fight 
for bandwidth with attack traffic, but at least you may be able to 
reduce the number of variables in the equation that are affected by 
the attack.
The ability to firewall comes down to being able to identify the 
malicious traffic from the rest of the traffic. There may be certain 
circumstances in how the attack has been constructed that will 
help you, or you may be able to utilize tactics such as the use of a 
darknet (see above) to take an active role in sorting the malicious 
traffic from the legitimate traffic. If doing a traffic analysis reveals 
that attack traffic is coming predominantly from a single or 
small number of countries based on geolocation of the source IP 
addresses, then all traffic from those countries may be blocked 
at the firewall if the firewall supports blocking on IP geolocation. 
This is a fairly harsh measure and will likely also cause some 
collateral damage, but in the early stages of mitigation, this may be 
warranted.
If your website is locally hosted within your nation and 
your audience is almost entirely within the same country, then 
another drastic measure is to block all traffic coming from any 
IP geolocated outside the local country. This can be an effective 
short-term response to a DDoS attack, as the ‘zombie’ computers 
that make up the botnet are likely to be widely distributed around 
the world, not centered in your local nation. By blocking all but 
local traffic, particularly if it can be done upstream, the majority of 
your audience who is local will still be able to get to your content, 
while most of the attack traffic will not.
When thinking of utilizing firewalling as a DoS mitigation tactic, 
remember that the further upstream the firewalling can be done, 
the more effective it will likely be in helping your situation. This 
means talking to your service provider as well as your service 
provider’s upstream provider.
open provider Mirrors
If not already in place, having been done in the preparatory phase, 
then set up an open provider mirror as quickly as you can. This is a 
very popular option for NGOs and opposition and activist websites 
that come under DoS attack, as it can be very effective in getting 
a form of the site content back up and available at an arbitrary 
speed—the goal of the initial phase. Please refer to the description 
of the same name within the ‘Part 1: Preparatory Phase’ section of 
this document for further information on this type of site mirroring.
distriButed content
If set up in the preparatory phase, then activate this mechanism 
now and start sending your content to be hosted within portions of 
allied websites. If no arrangements for the provision of a publishing 
channel for your content has been made in advance, then a plea 
for other website owners to embed your content via an RSS feed or 
similar can be made while the DoS attack is underway.
Darknet
If set up in the preparatory phase, then activate this mechanism 
now. It may or may not work, depending on whether the attack 
software used by the attacker does DNS lookups for your web 
servers or not. 
forgoing tHe doMain
This is a very drastic measure, and one likely to have only very 
short-term benefits in mitigating a DoS attack. This strategy relies 
on hosting your website either on IP addresses not associated with 
the website’s normal domain name, or hosting it on an alternate 
domain name. There is likely only a short amount of time before 
the attacker realizes you have shifted your website and adds the 
new IP address(es) or domain(s) to their attack configuration. This 
gives you just a small window where your audience may be able 
to get to your content. The greatest challenge of this strategy is to 
find quick and creative ways to let your audience know where to 
find your content.
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reStoratIve PhaSe
The aim of the restorative phase is to get the site available to the 
users again in its original form and capability. In this phase, the 
site may still be slow or a little sporadic, but the full content should 
now be available to the users.
reStoratIve PhaSe StrategIeS  
For MItIgatIng doS attackS
Hosting location
If the geographic hosting location of your website has proven to 
be the wrong choice to defend against DoS attacks, then you may 
have to move the site to another location. This move may be from a 
local provider to an overseas provider, or from an overseas provider 
to a local provider, depending on your current hosting situation, 
where the majority of your target audience is geographically 
located, and the political environment you operate within. Please 
refer to the Hosting Location section in ‘Part 1: Preparatory Phase’ 
within this document for further information.
load Balanced Mirrors
To get your site back in operation in a form more consistent with 
its usual look and capability, you may need to rush out a Load 
Balanced Mirror solution. Please refer to the Load Balanced Mirrors 
section in ‘Part 1: Preparatory Phase’ within this document for 
further information.
Big BandwidtH Mirrors
If under a rate-based DoS attack, this is probably one of the quicker 
restorative solutions that can be implemented. Please refer to the 
Big Bandwidth Mirrors section in ‘Part 1: Preparatory Phase’ within 
this document for further information.
long terM PhaSe
The aim of the long term phase is to fully restore the performance 
of the full-featured website back to at least its original capability. 
By the end of this phase, the website will be able to stand up to 
whatever the attacker throws at the site, both in the immediate 
crisis and also into the future.
long terM PhaSe StrategIeS For 
MItIgatIng doS attackS
tHird party denial of service 
protection (dosp)
There is no question that the only truly robust solution to the full 
array of DoS and DDoS attacks is to obtain third party DoSP. At this 
time it can be expensive, but in order to remain online under any 
DoS attack, this is what it takes to ensure success. Therefore, the 
long term strategy to aim for is DoSP.
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
hot tIPS
1. Google app engine, blogger.com, and cloudflare.com services are specifically DDoS 
protected. Put a page up there to attain excellent DDoS resilience. 
2. Approach non-profits and security firms for additional protection and support. In ad-
dition to accessnow.org (email soc@accessnow.org), other organizations may assist 
you. The Tactical Tech Collective (email ttc@tacticaltech.org) is another NGO with 
DDoS mitigation experience. Prepare for communicating securely with these organi-
zations by setting up PGP encryption capability. 
3. Try the Tor and Telecomix IRC channels and state that your site is experiencing a 
DDoS attack. Someone may offer to assist you or direct you to someone who can. 
4. Cloud computing services may help your website capability grow to meet a DDoS 
attack, but understand this growth comes with a cost. DDoS is trying to exhaust the 
weakest link in your resources including the money in your bank account. 
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concluSIon
The threat of DoS attack for Civil Society organizations is very real and likely to become 
more common in the near future. If possible, prepare for DoS attack as much as your 
resources will allow. If you do find your website under DoS attack, try not to panic. If 
your staff follows the steps in this guide, they should be able to navigate through the 
phases of response to incrementally restore your valuable service to your audience.
info@accessnow.org
This document is up to date as of January 2012 and signed by 
Access Security Operations Center, soc@accessnow.org  
(PGP Key ID: 0xF08D380A).
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
5. Caching is your best friend in high performance hosting. The more you cache the 
better you can withstand a DoS or DDoS attack. Dynamic sites are harder to protect. 
Know which parts of your site are the slowest to deliver a response and if these are 
fueling the effectiveness of the attack, block traffic to those services. 
6. Have your RSS feed followed by the major social social networking sites; Google, 
Facebook, and Twitter. Google Feedburner can take your RSS feed and automatically 
publish it to Facebook and Twitter. 
7. It is a good idea to have a lightweight version of your website. A website with hun-
dreds of components that make up a page is much more difficult to serve while the 
web server or network is under stress, compared with a simpler page that can be 
served with a single request. 
8. Fast pages are extremely difficult to take offline with an attack. You can grow the 
number and size of reverse-caching proxies in front of your web or application servers 
to create a lightning-quick proxy cloud that may be able to absorb much of the attack 
while still serving some of your site content to legitimate visitors.
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